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GUNS AND AMMO: FOR CONVICTED AMERICANS VIEWING 
PICTURES OF OTHERS ENJOYING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN A MAGAZINE 
IS THE CLOSEST THEY WILL EVER GET TO SEEING THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT AT WORK 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Hughes1 
(decided April 19, 2011) 
 
The defendant, Franklin Hughes, was convicted of possession 
of a weapon in the second degree and in the third degree. 2  The 
defendant appealed his conviction under Penal Law section 265.02(1) 
and section 265.03(3), alleging that the statutes violated his Second 
Amendment right, both under the United States Constitution and the 
Civil Rights Law section 4. 3   The Appellate Division, Second 
Department, rejected the defendant‘s argument, holding that Penal 
Law section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3) were constitutional.4  
The Second Department concluded that criminalizing the possession 
                                                          
1 921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011). 
2 Id. at 300; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(1) (McKinney 2011) which reads: ―A person is 
guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when: [s]uch person commits 
the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree . . . and has been 
previously convicted of any crime.‖; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03(3) (McKinney 2011) which 
provides, in pertinent part, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the 
second degree when ―such person possesses any loaded firearm.‖  The defendant was 
convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree based on the provision 
under sub division one, because he was previously convicted of a crime.  Hughes, 921 
N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
3 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 300; U.S. CONST. amend. II. (The Second Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides ―the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed.‖); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 4 (McKinney 2011) (which provides ―the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.‖). 
4 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 302. 
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2012] SECOND AMENDMENT 666 
of a weapon by a person previously convicted of a crime did not 
transgress the Second Amendment or New York Civil Rights Law.5  
The court based its holding on the grounds that the statutes were not 
―a complete ban on hand guns and [are], therefore, not a ‗severe 
restriction‘ improperly infringing upon defendant‘s Second 
Amendment rights.‖6 
On July 8, 2009, the defendant, Franklin Hughes, was 
convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third 
degree. 7   The defendant had prior convictions for attempted 
possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree and resisting 
arrest.8  These prior convictions made it possible for the defendant to 
be found guilty by the county court. 9   The Appellate Division, 
Second Department, affirmed the decision handed down by the 
county court finding the defendant guilty of criminal possession of a 
weapon in the second and third degree.10 
On appeal, the defendant alleged that Penal Law section 
265.02(1) and Penal Law section 265.03(3) violated the United States 
Constitution and the Civil Rights Law, section 4.11  The defendant‘s 
argument was based on recent decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, Ill.12  The defendant‘s argument relied on these two 
                                                          
5 Id. at 301. 
6 Id. at 301 (quoting People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 
2009)). 
7 Id. at 300. 
8 Daniel Wise, Gun Curb Survives High Court Decision, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 2011 
(explaining that the attempted possession of a control substance is a class E felony and the 
resisting arrest charge was considered a class A misdemeanor); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
220.06(1) (McKinney 2011) (―A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled 
substance in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses . . . a controlled 
substance with intent to sell it.‖); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 2011) (―A person is 
guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police 
officer or peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person.‖). 
9 Wise, supra note 8.  It was the defendant‘s prior convictions for attempted possession of 
a controlled substance in the fifth degree and resisting arrest that allowed him to be charged 
and found guilty under section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3).  Id.; under the Penal Law 
section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3) to be found guilty of criminal possession there is a 
requirement that the person has ―been previously convicted of any crime . . . .‖  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
10 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 300. 
11 Id. 
12 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the United States Constitution‘s Second 
Amendment grants a constitutionally protected individual right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense in the home); 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second 
2
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2012] SECOND AMENDMENT 667 
decisions in making his appeal to have his criminal conviction 
overturned. 13   The defendant argued that the Penal Law section 
265.02(1) and Penal Law section 265.03(3) violated his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms by making it a criminal penalty to 
possess a firearm after committing a crime.14  The defendant claimed 
the statutes in question were unconstitutionally overbroad because 
they restrict the rights of anyone who has been convicted of any 
crime.15 
The Appellate Division, Second Department, denied the 
defendant‘s claim and upheld the constitutionality of Penal Law 
section 265.02(1) and Penal Law section 265.03(3). 16   The court 
agreed with the defendant‘s position that Heller and McDonald did in 
fact confer the basic individual right to bear arms for self-defense in 
the home, but the Second Department refused to recognize that this 
right was unlimited. 17   The Second Department relied on Justice 
Scalia‘s majority opinion in Heller recognizing that the rights granted 
by the Second Amendment were not unlimited. 18   This was the 
foundation the court used to make their decision that Penal Law 
sections 265.02(1) and 265.03(3) are constitutional.19 
The Second Department relied on important dicta from Heller 
that the Second Amendment was an individual right, which could be 
regulated. 20   Of crucial importance was Justice Scalia‘s statement 
regarding restrictions upon the Second Amendment that 
[n]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
                                                                                                                                       
Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is 
fully applicable to the States); Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
13 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
14 Id. at 300-01. 
15 Id. at 301. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (―[l]ike most rights, the right 
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited‖). 
18 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
19 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02. 
20 Id. at 301. 
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commercial sale of arms.21 
From Justice Scalia‘s opinion, the Second Department rationalized 
that the Penal Laws were not in violation of the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms. 22   The Second Department strengthened their 
holding by utilizing People v. Perkins,
23
 a decision of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department.24  The Second Department agreed with 
the Third Department‘s opinion that ― ‗[u]nlike the statute at issue in 
Heller, Penal Law article 265 does not effect a complete ban on 
handguns and is, therefore, not a ‗severe restriction‘ improperly 
infringing upon the defendant‘s Second Amendment rights.‘ ‖25  In 
differentiating the two New York decisions from the Heller decision, 
the Second Department recognized the issue presented by Heller 
involved a complete ban, whereas the two New York jurisdictions 
were not a total ban on possession of handguns.26 
The Second Department reconciled the final claim made by 
the defendant that the statues in question were unconstitutionally 
overbroad.27   The distinction the court enumerated in denying the 
defendant‘s claim was based on the Penal Law, which defines a crime 
as ―a misdemeanor or a felony.‖ 28   Accordingly, the Second 
Department held that the phrase ―any crime‖ in the statue was not 
overbroad and, therefore, was constitutional in accordance with the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Heller.29 
The Supreme Court focused a lot of attention on District of 
Columbia v. Heller, because it was the first major decision made on a 
                                                          
21 Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
22 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02. 
23 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 2009). 
24 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210.  The Appellate Division, 
Third Department, handed down its decision in a case that was similar to Hughes.  Id.  The 
defendant, Shawn Perkins, was convicted under criminal possession of a firearm in both the 
second and third degree.  Id.  The defendant, upon appeal of his conviction put forth the 
argument that the statutes he was convicted under, part of the same Penal Law codes Hughes 
was convicted under, were in violation of his Second Amendment rights and Civil Rights 
Law § 4.  Id. 
25 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (quoting Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 2011).  Section six reads:  ― ‗Crime‘ means a 
misdemeanor or a felony.‖  Id.  The court in Hughes stressed this distinction to show that 
―lesser matters such as violations and traffic infractions do not fall within the ambit of the 
challenged statutes.‖  Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
29 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02. 
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2012] SECOND AMENDMENT 669 
Second Amendment issue by the Supreme Court since 1939.30  Prior 
to the decision in Heller, the issue of firearms lay dormant for almost 
seventy years.  In 1939, the Supreme Court decided United States v. 
Miller31 which was initiated in response to the National Firearms Act 
of 1934.32 
Miller involved two men, defendants Jack Miller and Frank 
Layton, who were accused of transporting firearms in interstate 
commerce. 33   The weapon being transported was an unregistered 
twelve-gauge shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in 
length. 34   The shotgun the two men were transporting was 
unregistered at the time, making it a violation under Title 26 of the 
United States Code, the National Firearms Act.35  The police arrested 
them in violation of this act.36  The charges against Miller and Layton 
were dismissed by the district court, holding the Second Amendment 
was violated by the Act.37 
The United States argued on appeal that the purpose of the 
Second Amendment was to effectuate a well-maintained militia, and 
the shotguns were not being used for this purpose. 38   Justice 
McReynolds agreed with this argument by noting that ―absen[t] any 
evidence . . . [showing] possession or use of a ‗shotgun having a 
                                                          
30 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 175 n.1. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  The sawed-off shotgun was originally introduced in 1898, by Winchester for use by 
police in riot control.  People v. Cortez, 442 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874-75 (Sup. Ct. 1981).  It soon 
became an effective tool of the criminal element because ―[f]irst, the removal of the choke, 
by cutting the barrel, exposes potential victims to greater peril. Second, cutting the barrel 
and/or the stock makes it easier to conceal.‖  Id.  A sawed-off shotgun is a standard shotgun 
that has had the barrel of the gun altered by decreasing the length of the barrel.  Id. 
35 Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
36 Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
48, 49 (2008). 
37 United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939), rev’d, 307 U.S. 174 
(1939). 
38 Miller, 307 U.S at 176.  On appeal ―[t]he court gave Miller‘s counsel . . . two weeks to 
submit his written brief and prepare for a grueling interrogation by the justices.‖  Robert A. 
Levy, Second Amendment Haze, WASH. TIMES, June 17 2008.  The defendant‘s counsel, 
―who was court-appointed and had not been compensated, replied he had received neither 
the government‘s brief nor a copy of the trial record.  He wanted to file a brief, but doubted 
he could travel all the way to Washington, D.C., for oral argument.‖  Id.  The Supreme Court 
responded to Gutensohn, offering a later date to present the case.  Id.  Gutensohn replied, by 
telegram saying ― ‗[s]uggest case be submitted on [government‘s] brief.  Unable to obtain 
any money from clients to be present and argue case.‘ ‖  Id. 
5
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barrel of less than eighteen inches in length . . . ‘ has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated 
militia, . . . the Second Amendment [does not] guarantee[] the right to 
keep and bear such an instrument.‖39  The court held that the National 
Firearms Act was constitutional and it did not violate the Second 
Amendment.40 
In the decision the court wrestled with how to apply the 
Second Amendment in reference to a well-organized militia, which 
the court felt was its purpose.41  Following Miller, courts ―struggle[d] 
to decipher its holding.‖42   This decision remained the last major 
decision on the Second Amendment until the Supreme Court decided 
Heller in 2008. 
Contrary to Miller, in People v. Hughes, 43  the Second 
Department neglected to rule on any specific purpose or protection 
provided by the Second Amendment or the New York Civil Rights 
Law. 44   Instead, the Second Department focused on whether the 
application of the statute prohibiting firearms under certain 
circumstances was constitutional. 45   The Second Department 
discussed only ―a policy determination by the Legislature that ‗an 
illegal weapon is more dangerous in the hands of a convicted 
criminal than in the possession of a novice to the criminal justice 
system.‘ ‖ 46   While the Second Department relied heavily on the 
decision in Heller, it did not narrow or clarify how the Heller 
decision would apply to New York.47 
At issue in Heller were statutes that provided for a complete 
ban on the carrying of handguns and lawfully-possessed guns needed 
to be disassembled or locked while not in use for lawful activities.48  
                                                          
39 Miller, 307 U.S at 178. 
40 Id. at 183. 
41 Id. at 178-79. 
42 Frye, supra note 36, at 49.  ―Some find Miller adopted an individual right theory of the 
Second Amendment, some find it adopted a collective right theory, and some find it adopted 
a hybrid theory, protecting the right to possess a firearm in connection with militia service.‖  
Id.  This would be one of the points that the Court in Heller would debate as well.  See 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
43 921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 301. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Heller, 554 U.S. at 575. 
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The statutes at issue were challenged on the basis that they violated 
the Second Amendment.49  Respondent, Dick Heller, was a special 
police officer in the District of Columbia who was authorized as part 
of his position to carry a firearm while on duty.50  He applied for 
registration of a handgun to use in his home, but his application was 
denied.51  This prompted him to bring his lawsuit against the District 
of Columbia, challenging the statutes as a violation of the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.52 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether these 
statutes violated the defendant‘s Second Amendment right to bear 
arms.53  The Supreme Court recognized that there are two opposing 
views on what the Second Amendment protects.54  First, there was 
the view that was championed by the dissenting Justices in Heller, 
that the protection offered by the Second Amendment only gave the 
right to carry firearms in connection with activities of a militia.
55
     
The second view was the view of the respondent that the 
Second Amendment protects ―an individual right to possess a firearm 
unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for 
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the 
home.‖56  This was the view of the majority in the decision.57  Justice 
Scalia‘s majority opinion concluded that the primary purpose of the 
Second Amendment is for self-defense.58 
Historically, the rights secured by the Second Amendment are 
not connected with service in the Militia.59  The Supreme Court, in its 
analysis of the intent of the framers of the Second Amendment prior 
to ratification, concluded from sources at the time that the Second 
Amendment was advanced for the purposes of self-defense.60  The 
                                                          
49 Id. at 575-76.  The statutes that were at issue were ―D.C.Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-
2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).‖  Id. at 575. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Heller, 554 U.S. at 575-76. 
53 Id. at 576. 
54 Id. at 577. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Heller, 554 U.S.at 595. 
58 Id. at 630. 
59 Id. at 582. 
60 Id. at 606.  This turns out to be the core right that the majority feels is protected by the 
Second Amendment.  Id. at 630. 
7
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Supreme Court, in Heller, recognized that central to the Second 
Amendment is an ―inherent right of self-defense.‖61  According to the 
majority, the right that is granted is ―the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.‖62  In 
Heller, the statutes in the District of Columbia amounted to a total 
ban on use of weapons for self-defense in the home, which the 
Supreme Court determined violated the Second Amendment.63  The 
majority held that self-defense was ―the central component of the 
right itself.‖64  The significance that the Supreme Court placed on 
self-defense was an essential element in the court‘s holding.65 
The Supreme Court‘s holding in Heller consisted of two 
concepts as to what protections were offered under the Second 
Amendment.66   The first part of the holding was that the Second 
Amendment confers upon an individual the right to keep and bear 
arms.67  The other important part of the holding is that if a statute 
either bans handgun possession in the home or renders a gun 
inoperable in the home, the statute is in violation of the Second 
Amendment.68 
In making its decision that the Second Amendment grants 
certain individual rights, the Supreme Court recognized that ―[l]ike 
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited.‖69  This is an important component in analyzing whether 
prohibitions on handgun ownership by a person previously convicted 
of a crime violates the Constitution.  The Court explicitly stated that 
some prohibitions on gun ownership are acceptable.70  For example, 
the Supreme Court noted that prohibitions on carrying of firearms by 
                                                          
61 Id. at 628. 
62 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
63 Id. at 628-29.  The Court described the District of Columbia‘s statutory scheme by 
stating that ―[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction 
of the District‘s handgun ban.‖  Id. at 629. 
64 Id. at 599. 
65 Id. at 635. 
66 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
67 Id.  This secures a person‘s right under the Second Amendment to keep and bear 
firearms in their home in order to protect and defend.  Id. at 628-29.  The need for self-
defense in a person‘s home is the most ―acute‖ according the majority in Heller.  Id. at 628. 
68 Id. at 628-29. 
69 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. The Supreme Court also noted that ―[w]e identify these 
presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be 
exhaustive.‖  Id. at 627 n.26. 
70 Id. at 626-27. 
8
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the mentally ill or felons are acceptable.71  The Supreme Court left 
open many questions after Heller including a test or a standard to 
determine what regulations are consistent with the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms. 
After Heller, one of the questions that remained was whether 
this decision was intended to be binding on the states, through 
incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.72  When the decision was handed down in 2008, the 
Second Amendment was one of the few amendments that had not 
been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.73  This question was answered when the Supreme Court 
handed down its plurality decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
Ill.74 
The petitioners in the case were Chicago residents who 
wanted to keep handguns in their home for the purpose of self-
defense.75  Defendants, the City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, 
had statutes in place that in essence were banned ownership of 
handguns. 76   The City of Chicago enacted the ban on handgun 
possession in order to protect residents of the city from property loss 
                                                          
71 Id. at 626. 
72 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13.  The Bill of Rights of the United States 
Constitution at its inception only applied to the federal government, and the states were in no 
way encumbered by it.  Id. at 3028.  It was not until after the Civil War and the adoption of 
the Reconstruction Amendments that this view changed.  Id.  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment became the avenue the Supreme Court utilized in order to 
incorporate the protections offered by the Bill of Rights and apply them to the states.  Id.  
Originally, ― the only rights protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause 
were those rights ‗of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of 
law.‘ ‖  Id. at 3031 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)).  Slowly the 
Supreme Court began to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the state through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, choosing to follow the theory of selective 
incorporation.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034.  Even though the incorporation was selective, 
out of the first eight amendments of the United States Constitution at the time McDonald 
was decided, there were only three amendments remaining to be incorporated to the states.  
Id. at 3035 n.13.  The Supreme Court recognized that the only amendments that had not been 
made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were the ―Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict . . . the Third Amendment‘s 
protection against quartering of soldiers; the Fifth Amendment‘s grand jury indictment 
requirement; the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and the Eighth 
Amendment‘s prohibition on excessive fines.‖  Id. 
73 Id. at 3035 n.13 
74 Id. at 3020. 
75 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3026. 
76 Id. at 3026. 
9
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or death.77  The petitioner‘s argument was that the regulation did the 
exact opposite of what it intended to do, making it harder for citizens 
to protect themselves which was established by the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Heller.78  The defendants argued that the statutes were 
constitutional because they were not bound by the decision in Heller, 
as the Second Amendment was not applicable to the states.79 
The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment is 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment80  and, therefore, is fully applicable to state actions. 81  
The Supreme Court affirmed dicta in Heller that certain restrictions 
on possession of firearms are acceptable, and the incorporation of the 
Second Amendment would not ―imperil every law regulating 
firearms.‖82 
These two Supreme Court decisions establish an important 
foundation for determining whether prior criminal convictions are a 
valid ground for prohibition of ownership of firearms.  Both cases 
said that restrictions on the Second Amendment individual right were 
appropriate, but the Court failed to lay out a foundation as to the type 




                                                          
77 Id. at 3026. 
78 Id. at 3026-27.  The petitioners in the case were often ―the targets of threats and 
violence.‖  Id. at 3026.  The Court offered the example of petitioner, Otis McDonald, who 
was in his late seventies.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026-27.  Mr. McDonald ―lives in a high-
crime neighborhood.  Id. at 3027.  ―He is a community activist involved with alternative 
policing strategies, and his efforts to improve his neighborhood have subjected him to 
violent threats from drug dealers.‖  Id. 
79 Id. at 3026-27. 
80 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides ―[n]o State . . .  shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .‖. 
81 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.  The opinion in McDonald was only a plurality.  Id.  
Justice Thomas agreed with the four justices in favor of incorporation.  Id.  The plurality 
believed that the Second Amendment was incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment by way of Due Process Clause.  Id.  Justice Thomas agreed with incorporation, 
but it would be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendments Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.  Id. at 3058-59.  Justice Thomas wrote ―the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege 
of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.‖  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3059. 
82 Id. at 3047. 
83 See Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020. 
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After Heller, most of the circuits ruled that the possession of 
firearms by a person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the 
core right established in Heller.84  The decisions handed down by the 
federal trial courts on the issue of possession of firearms by convicted 
criminals mirror decisions in the circuit courts on the same issue.85 
In reliance on Heller and McDonald, federal circuits have 
consistently ruled that restricting possession of a firearm by a person 
previously convicted of a crime is a valid restriction on the Second 
Amendment right.86  The federal statutory provision on this issue that 
has continually been called into question regarding its 
constitutionality is section 922 of the United States Code titled 
―Unlawful Acts.‖87  While the statute has often been challenged as 
being unconstitutional since 2008, it has continued to withstand these 
challenges.88 
One of the first federal cases to deal with the issue of whether 
a law denying people who have prior criminal convictions the right of 
gun ownership violates the Second Amendment was a decision 
handed down by Chief Judge Easterbrook in the United States v. 
Skoien.89  Steven Skoien had been previously convicted on charges of 
domestic violence.90  While on probation the defendant was found to 
be in possession of three firearms and pled guilty to the charge that 
                                                          
84 See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (In order to differentiate the individual right of possession of a 
firearm for self-defense, the courts focused on a person who was law-abiding or a 
responsible citizen). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162 (D. Me. 2008) (holding 
that a ―law prohibiting persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence survives Second Amendment scrutiny.‖); United States v. Smith, 742 F. 
Supp. 2d 855, 861-62 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (holding that the statute the defendant was charged 
under was ―presumptively lawful‖); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2010) (holding that U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) was constitutional). 
86 See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
regulation of possession of firearms by a person with a prior criminal history is not in 
violation of a person‘s individual rights under the Second Amendment of the United States 
Constitution). 
87 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2011).  The code reads in pertinent part: ―[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence, to . . . [possess] . . . any firearm or ammunition . . . .‖  Id. 
88 United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that 
every court which has considered a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922, post-
Heller, has upheld the statute as constitutional). 
89 Skoien, 614 F.3d 638. 
90 Id. at 639. 
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he violated 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9).91  In determining whether 
the statute the defendant was charged under was constitutional, the 
court recognized that the Supreme Court left the issue open for lower 
courts to decide.92  By utilizing the limited guidance given by the 
Supreme Court that ―some categorical disqualifications [on the 
Second Amendment] are permissible,‖ the court in Skoien was able to 
make its decision that the statute in question was constitutional.93  
The circuit court held that disqualification of the right to possess a 
firearm upon criminal conviction is acceptable under the Heller 
dicta.94 
After the Seventh Circuit decided the issue in Skoien, it would 
again have to make a ruling on a similar issue in United States v. 
Williams. 95   This time the defendant, Adam Williams, made the 
argument that a statute criminalizing his possession of a firearm as a 
convicted felon was unconstitutional because this ―infringed on his 
right to possess firearms for use in self-defense.‖96 
In Williams, the defendant was the subject of a narcotics 
investigation carried out by the Hammond, Indiana, Police 
Department. 97   After the police gathered enough evidence, they 
obtained a warrant and sought to arrest the defendant. 98   Upon 
arriving at the defendant‘s place of residence, there was no answer 
and the police knocked down the door. 99   The defendant was in 
possession of a firearm, but put it down when he saw the police.100  
The defendant claimed that he thought there was an intruder, and he 
went to the bedroom for his gun for self-defense.101  The defendant‘s 
                                                          
91 Id.  The defendant claimed he used his guns for hunting purposes, which is protected 
under Heller, and that he was only convicted of misdemeanors, not felonies. 
92 Id. at 640. 
93 Id. at 641. 
94 Skoien, 614 F.3d. at 645. 
95 United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010). 
96 Id. at 691.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2011) states in part, ―It shall be unlawful for any 
person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess 
in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.‖ 
97 Williams, 616 F.3d. at 687. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 687. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 688.  After the defendant‘s arrest, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
met him in jail to give him his Miranda Rights.  Williams, 616 F.3d. at 687-88.  Williams 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/14
  
2012] SECOND AMENDMENT 677 
claim was that ―the statute criminalizing his possession of a firearm 
as a convicted felon was unconstitutional because it infringed on his 
right to possess firearms for use in self-defense.‖ 102   The court 
rejected the defendant‘s argument and held that ―some categorical 
disqualifications [on firearm possession] are permissible.‖103  In its 
holding, the court agreed with the decision in Skoien that the right to 
possession of a firearm was not absolute.104 
One of the most recent cases addressing partial ban in the 
light of Heller and McDonald, was in the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in 
United States v. Chester.105  The defendant, William Samuel Chester, 
had previously been convicted of domestic violence in West Virginia 
in 2005.106  The defendant argued that, in violation of the Second 
Amendment, 18 U.S.C.A. section 922(g)(9) denied him possession of 
firearms for self-defense.107  Aligning itself with its sister circuits in 
addressing the defendant‘s claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
defendant‘s right to bear arms was not being violated because 
permissible restrictions are allowed under Heller.108 
Following the federal example, New York courts have 
generally decided that regulations on gun ownership by a person 
convicted of a crime does not violate an individual‘s Second 
Amendment rights.109  The first case in New York to deal with an 
alleged Second Amendment violation, post Heller, was decided by 
the Appellate Division, Third Department in People v. Perkins.110 
Perkins involved a claim similar to the one presented in 
Hughes. 111   In Perkins, the defendant alleged that his conviction 
                                                                                                                                       
told ―agents that when the officers had arrived to execute the warrant, he believed that 
someone was breaking into his house in an attempt to rob him, which is why he had retrieved 
the gun from under his bed.‖  Id. at 688. 
102 Id. at 691. 
103 Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641). 
104 Williams, 616 F.3d at 692. 
105 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010). 
106 Id. at 677.  In 2007, the defendant was once again facing domestic violence charges 
when the police were called to his residence after he threatened his wife.  Id. at 676-77.  
While searching the home the police discovered weapons, to which Chester admitted were 
his.  Id. at 677. 
107 Id. 
108 Chester, 628 F.3d at 682-83.  The protection given to the right to bear arms in Heller 
was a core right that was only granted to law abiding citizens.  Id. 
109 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210; Hughes, 921 N.Y.S. at 302. 
110 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209. 
111 Id. at 210. 
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under section 265 of the Penal Law violated the Second 
Amendment.112  The defendant was convicted of criminal possession 
of a weapon in the second and third degree.113  The court held that the 
statutes the defendant was charged under did not violate the Second 
Amendment or Civil Rights Law. 114   In discussing the 
constitutionality of Penal Law section 265, the Third Department 
recognized that the Penal Law was not a complete ban on 
handguns. 115   The court found that the statute placed no ―severe 
restriction‖ on the defendant‘s Second Amendment rights.116  This 
rationale would be followed by other courts in New York when 
deciding whether denial of ownership of a firearm violates an 
individual‘s Second Amendment rights.117 
It was not long before another New York court would be 
faced with determining the constitutionality of Penal Law section 
265.02(1) and section 265.03(3). 118   Less than two years after 
Perkins, the Second Department relied upon Perkins and held that the 
Penal Law section 265.02(1) and section 265.03(3) were clearly 
constitutional.119  Placing great reliance on the Third Department‘s 
holding in Perkins, the Second Department acknowledged that the 
statutes were not ―severe restriction[s]‖ on Hughes‘ Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.120 
After the holdings were handed down by the Second 
Department in Hughes and Third Department in Perkins, the trial 
courts in New York began to apply the decisions to similar Second 
Amendment challenges.121  The criminal courts of Kings County and 




115 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
116 Id. 
117 People v. Gerlow, 925 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (App. Div. 3d Dep‘t 2011).  ―Defendant‘s     
. . . argument that Penal Law § 265.02 violates the Second Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution is unpreserved and, in any event, lacks merit.‖  Id. (citing Perkins, 62 A.D.3d 
1160; Hughes, 83 A.D.3d 960). 
118 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
119 Id. at 302. 
120 Id. at 301. 
121 See People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2010) (―This court 
rejects as being without merit, defendant‘s argument that Penal Law § 265.01 violates the 
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.‖); People v. Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801 
(Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2011) (―[T]his Court holds that neither PL § 265.01(1) nor AC § 
10131(b) violates the Second Amendment and neither is unconstitutional as applied to 
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Bronx County handed down decisions relying on Perkins in holding 
that Penal Law section 265.01(1) did not violate either defendant‘s 
Second Amendment rights.122  New York is not the only state to ban 
possession of firearms by a person convicted of a crime.123  Many 
states have regulations that bar prior convicted criminals the right to 
possess firearms, and these regulations have survived constitutional 
challenges in light of the decision handed down in Heller.124 
While, the current state of federal and state law is in 
agreement that statutes that regulate possession of a firearm by a 
person criminally convicted do not violate the Second Amendment, 
the question remains as to how far a regulation may go before 
becoming violative of the Second Amendment. 
One way to analyze government regulations in light of the 
Second Amendment is to determine whether ―the challenged 
regulation burdens the core right protected by the Second 
Amendment.‖125  The core right of the Second Amendment found in 
Heller is self-defense in the home.126  If a regulation burdens this core 
right then it would trigger a balancing test utilizing strict scrutiny to 
determine how stringent the burden is on the person‘s individual 
right.127  If the regulation does not burden this core right it would be 
subject to a lesser level of scrutiny.128  Under a lesser level of scrutiny 
any statute that did not burden this core right would be more likely to 
survive a constitutional challenge. 129   The restriction at issue in 
Heller denied the possession and use of firearms for protection in the 
home which is inconsistent with the core purpose of the Second 
Amendment.130  Arguably, the same can be said about the denial of 
possession of firearms by a convicted criminal for self-defense 
                                                                                                                                       
defendant.‖). 
122 Id. 
123 Farmer v. State, Dept. of Law, Office of Atty. Gen., 235 P.3d 1012 (Alaska 2010); 
People v. Cross, 2010 WL 5113807 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2010); State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 
395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
124 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12316(b)(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.1; WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.41.040(4); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1)(a). 
125 Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 
70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2011). 
126 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29. 
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purposes in the home, requiring the court to weigh the restriction 
against the government‘s objectives in order to determine whether the 
burden on the core right serves a substantial government purpose.131 
This, in essence, is what the court did in Hughes.132  The court 
balanced the core right of gun ownership for self-defense purposes in 
the home with the government‘s interest in keeping weapons out of 
possession of prior convicted criminals.133  As explained in Hughes, 
―the statutes represent a policy determination by the Legislature that 
‗an illegal weapon is more dangerous in the hands of a convicted 
criminal than in the possession of a novice to the criminal justice 
system.‘ ‖134  Here, the interest of the government is a strong one in 
keeping firearms out of the hands of criminals previously 
convicted. 135   The government‘s interest is balanced against the 
individual right secured under the Second Amendment.  The outcome 
of the balancing of the interests in this circumstance would allow the 
government to infringe on the Second Amendment.  Hughes can be 
reconciled with Perkins because it is not a ―complete ban‖ on 
firearms that is a ―severe restriction‖ on the Second Amendment.136  
The burden/balance approach allows for regulations affecting the 
concealed carrying of weapons in public or the licensing of guns 
because these restrictions do not attack the core of the Second 
Amendment protection in the home.137  This approach also leaves 
open ample channels to possess a firearm in the home for self-
defense. 
The one problem facing federal and state courts on the issue 
of firearm possession by criminals is the failure to distinguish 
between violent and nonviolent crimes.138  The statutes at issue in 
                                                          
131 Id. at 1165. 
132 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 302. 
133 Id. at 301 (―Instead, as relevant to the discussion here, the statutes represent a policy 
determination by the Legislature that ‗an illegal weapon is more dangerous in the hands of a 
convicted criminal than in the possession of a novice to the criminal justice system.‘ ‖ 
(quoting People v. Montilla, 862 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008))); Williams, 616 F.3d at 
693 (extending Hughes to include ―those individuals who by their prior conduct had 
demonstrated that they may not possess a firearm without being a threat to society.‖) 
(quoting Landers v. State, 299 S.E.2d 707, 709-11 (Ga. 1983)). 
134 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (quoting Montilla, 891 N.E.2d 1175). 
135 Williams, 616 F.3d at 693. 
136 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
137 Kiehl, supra at 125, at 1164. 
138 See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (Stating that ―while 
felon-in-possession laws could be criticized as ‗wildly overinclusive‘ for encompassing 
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Hughes also fail to provide any distinction. 139   The statutes that 
Hughes was convicted under require that a defendant previously be 
convicted of a crime.140   In New York, a crime is defined as ―a 
misdemeanor or felony,‖ without a distinction being made as to 
whether the crime is violent or nonviolent. 141   This means that a 
person, who was found guilty of fraud and served his sentence, would 
be permanently prohibited from owning a firearm.142  This lack of 
distinction between violent and nonviolent crimes is contrary to the 
purpose of keeping firearms out of the hands of dangerous criminals.  
Often times the punishment against firearm ownership is more 
extreme and unfair than the actual punishment for the crime itself, 
and often takes the right to bear arms away from nonviolent 
offenders.143 
One popular example was the highly publicized prosecution 
of Martha Stewart.144  In the article, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have 
a Gun?, C. Kevin Marshall raises the question ―[i]s the public safer 
now that Martha Stewart is completely and permanently 
disarmed?‖145  This question does not apply to just Martha Stewart, 
but also to many other citizens who have had their right to possess a 
firearm in accordance with the Second Amendment violated due to a 
conviction of a nonviolent crime.  While Justice Scalia‘s opinion in 
Heller acknowledged that certain provisions could be placed on 
handgun ownership, this seems to be a ―categorical ban‖ of a 
complete class of people.146  If one were to broadly interpret the dicta 
                                                                                                                                       
nonviolent offenders, every state court in the modern era to consider the propriety of 
disarming felons under analogous state constitutional provisions has concluded that step to 
be permissible.‖) 
139 Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 301. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00[6] (2008)). 
142 18 U.S.C. § 922; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01; White, 593 F.3d at 1205-06.  The court 
explained that the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), ―does not distinguish between the violent 
and non-violent offender.  Thus, both an armed robber and tax evader lose their right to bear 
arms on conviction under § 922(g)(1).‖ 
143 C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 695, 695-96 (2009).  In 2004, Martha Stewart was convicted of obstruction of justice, 
making false statements, and two counts of conspiracy.  Id.  Martha Stewart served her 
sentence, a term of five months, but would be banned from possessing a firearm for life in 
compliance with federal law.  Id. 
144 Id. at 695. 
145 Id. at 696. 
146 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29. 
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in Heller, this line of ruling by the courts goes against the interpreted 
purpose of the Second Amendment – to allow a person to possess a 
firearm for use in a home for the purpose of self-defense.147 
In United States v. Yancey,
148
 the restriction on a 
constitutional freedom seems to be taken to the fullest extent 
possible. 149   The Seventh Circuit was presented with the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(3),150 which prohibits 
any person ―who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled 
substance‖ from possessing a firearm.151  The defendant, Matthew 
Yancey, was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(3) 
for having a pistol in connection with being under the influence of 
marijuana.152  The defendant argued that the statute he was convicted 
under violated his Second Amendment right because he was not a 
felon and even though he was in public the weapon he was carrying 
was a ―commonplace‖ weapon.153  The Seventh Circuit upheld the 
defendant‘s conviction and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. section 
922(g)(3), even though the decision seems to be completely at odds 
with Heller and McDonald.154 
The court‘s decision emphasizes that section 922 was 
designed to achieve ―the broad objective of . . . suppressing armed 
violence . . . [that] is without doubt an important one.‖155  In addition, 
the court stated ―that keeping guns away from habitual drug abusers 
is substantially related to that goal [of suppressing violence].‖156  The 
court analogized that by keeping guns away from a person who was a 
drug user is the same as keeping guns out of the hands of a convicted 
felon.157  This reasoning in Yancey incorrectly stretches the narrow 
purpose of keeping firearms out of the hands of persons convicted of 
                                                          
147 Id. at 635. 
148 621 F.3d 681 (2010). 
149 Id. at 682.  ―Matthew Yancey pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as an unlawful 
user of marijuana . . .‖  Id.  In June 2008, Police officers executed an arrest warrant for 
Yancey.  Id.  At the time of his arrest, Yancey was carrying a loaded pistol and 0.7 grams of 
marijuana.  Id.  Yancey confessed that he was habitual marijuana user.  Yancey, 621 F.3d at 
682. 
150 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2011). 
151 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). 
152 Yancey, 621 F.3d at 682. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 687. 
155 Id. at 684. 
156 Id. 
157 Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684. 
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violent crimes to cover a group of people never convicted of a crime, 
but presumed that because they are under the influence of a substance 
that they will commit a crime and be in this position eventually.158  
The court noted that drug users, similarly to mentally ill persons are 
more likely to have trouble exercising self-control.159 
With the confusion in the courts as to what type of limitations 
are allowed, problems arise where the heart of self-defense is 
violated.  There is much disagreement about where to draw the line.  
The National Rifle Association (hereinafter ―NRA‖) argues that there 
is ―no evidence that ‗gun control‘ reduces crime, suicides or 
accidents in the U.S. or abroad.‖160  The NRA is an organization that 
describes itself ―as America‘s foremost defender of Second 
Amendment rights.‖161  The view of the NRA heavily leans toward 
expanding Second Amendment rights, and the NRA was one of the 
foremost supporters of the decision handed down in Heller.162  In an 
article, dated March 23, 2011, the NRA criticized the proposed ―The 
Fix Gun Checks Act of 2011.‖163  The NRA claimed the act 
would greatly expand the definition of those legally 
prohibited from owning firearms to include anyone 
who‘s ever been arrested—even if never convicted or 
found guilty—for drug possession within a five year 
period. . .  And it would seem fears that any new 
national gun control legislation would be used to limit 
the gun rights of law abiding citizens is at least 
partially justified.164 
Prohibitions on people who can own firearms are a major concern of 
supporters of the Second Amendment.  These prohibitions combined 
                                                          
158 Id. at 685. 
159 Id. 
160 NRA-ILA: Firearm Fact Card 2011, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, http://www.nraila. 
org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=83 (last visited September 25, 2011). 
161 A Brief History of the NRA, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, http://www.nra.org/ 
Aboutus.aspx (last visited September 25, 2011). 
162 NRA-ILA: Victory In The Supreme Court!, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE 
FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=4052 
(last visited September 25, 2011). 
163 NRA-ILA: New Gun Control Legislation Would Prohibit Those Arrested but not 
Convicted, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, 
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with court decisions similar to the decision in Yancey could 
foreshadow how the Second Amendment will be dealt with in the 
future.  The Second Amendment in its current state raises important 
issues to be considered such as the collateral consequences that are 
associated with being convicted of a crime. 
There are collateral consequences that will flow from the 
decision handed down in Hughes.  Decisions in the federal and state 
courts to deny convicted criminals possession of firearms will bring 
about new collateral consequences in the criminal justice system.  
While these collateral consequences are not mentioned in Hughes, 
they are of significant importance to a practicing attorney.  When a 
defendant is going through the criminal justice system because of a 
criminal charge, the lawyer will need to make that person aware that 
there are additional consequences of accepting a plea bargain.  A 
defendant who pleads guilty to a lesser criminal charge needs to be 
informed of the collateral consequences that will be associated with 
his plea.165  In essence, under the current law when a person accepts a 
plea bargain in the criminal justice system he or she will essentially 
be surrendering his or her Second Amendment right.166  It becomes 
important to notify defendants of this collateral consequence of 
accepting a plea that is a consequence similar to the loss of voting 
rights or professional licenses for guilty convictions. 
The holding handed down by the court in Hughes was the 
right outcome in a new, unclear area of constitutional law.  The 
Supreme Court has failed to offer much guidance regarding the 
questions left open in Heller and McDonald.  While the Second 
Department in Hughes did an effective job providing some answers 
to the questions left open in Heller, it was merely a beginning point.  
Currently, there is no clear test endorsed by the Supreme Court for 
dealing with restrictions on the Second Amendment.  While there 
seems to be unity in many of the state and federal courts, that could 
change.  The further removed one is from these decisions on the 
Second Amendment, the more questions presented to the courts 
regarding what regulations are reasonable and unreasonable in light 
of the underlying purpose will arise.  The legal system in the future 
will need to decide whether a person convicted of a violent crime is 
any different from a person in possession of a weapon convicted of a 
                                                          
165 Marshall, supra at 143, at 695. 
166 Id. 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/14
  
2012] SECOND AMENDMENT 685 
nonviolent crime.  In the area of possession of firearms by prior 
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